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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
FEDERAL Crv RIGHTS ACT-CIvIL CAUSE OF ACTION-WHETHER
PUNISHMENT FOR REFUSING TO INCRIMINATE ONESELF Is A DENIAL OF DUE
PROCESS THAT WOULD ALLOW A CAUSE OF ACTION TO ARISE UNDER THE
FEDERAL Crvm RIGHTS ACT' -The question, whether punishment for re-
fusing to incriminate oneself is a denial of due process that would allow a
cause of action to arise under the Federal Civil Rights Act arose in the
case of Hardwick v. Hurley.2 A policeman had beaten an arrested citizen
for refusing to take the drunkometer test. The victim of the beating con-
tended that he had a cause of action against the policeman under the
Civil Rights Act. The defendants answered that the beating occurred
in the performance of their duty as policemen, i.e., committed under "color
of law."
The Seventh Circuit upheld a cause of action under the Civil Rights
Act for Hardwick, the alleged victim of the police beating. The court
followed Monroe v. Pape3 which the Supreme Court had decided only a
few months before. In that case, Chicago policemen had broken into a
home without warrant, frightened the family, and subjected them to a
search, insults, and violence. The lower courts dismissed the case, stating
that there was no cause of action under the Civil Rights Act. The United
States Supreme Court reversed. In the majority opinion written by
Justice Douglas, it was said that the statute covers unconstitutional acts
unauthorized by the state, but done under "color of law" as the police
action in Monroe v. Pape as well as unconstitutional acts authorized by
the state.
Upon reviewing the discussion 4 preceding the enactment of the Civil
Rights Act, it is difficult to conceive upon what the dissenting justice in
Monroe v. Pape based his contention. In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Frankfurter stated that he believed the object Congress had in mind in the
Civil Rights Act was to prevent illegal exactions by the state, to prevent
state legislation that would be contrary to the Federal Constitution. In
other words, Justice Frankfurter believed the statute should be limited to
acts authorized by the state. At the time of the debate in 1871, over
whether the Civil Rights Bill should be enacted, the antagonists considered
the legislation unlawful under the 14th Amendment because it was in-
'42 U. S. C. § 1983.
2 289 F. 2d 529 (7th Cir., 1961).
3 365 U. S. 167 (1961).
4 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 653 (1871).
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tended, they believed, to interfere with the states even when the states
did not authorize unconstitutional acts.5 The protagonists did not appear
to contend to limit the legislation in the manner suggested by the dissent.
It can be said, therefore, that if Justice Frankfurter's opinions had pre-
vailed in 1871, the Civil Rights Act would never have been passed. It
becomes difficult to believe, then, upon reading the debate that the Civil
Rights Act was intended to be limited in application to state legislation.
In Hardwick v. Hurley,6 the court followed the decision of Monroe v.
Pope,7 but it cautioned that it would not give the decision in Monroe v.
Pape a broad interpretation and thus open the floodgates for litigation.
Both cases demonstrate fact situations in which the Civil Rights Act has
been used to protect an individual from an act by a state official that was
considered unlawful under the Federal Constitution. Another application
of the Civil Rights Act is illustrated by Lewis v. Brautigan. Here the
Court of Appeals held that when a prisoner is moved from jail to jail
so that he cannot confer with counsel, he has a cause of action against the
responsible authorities.
In speculation, one wonders to what other fact situations the Civil
Rights Act can be applied. It is true, when the debates in the Congres-
sional Globe are examined,9 that most of the discussion concentrated on
the problems of the day, such as minimizing the effect of the Klu Klux
Klan and eliminating anarchy and bloodshed. A bill similar to the Civil
Rights Act had been introduced in the same session of the House by Rep.
5 "The argument leads to the deduction that while the first section of the amend-
ment prohibits all deprivation of rights by means of state laws, yet all rights may
be subverted and denied without color of law, and the Federal Government have
no power to interfere. All you have to do, therefore, under this view, is to drive
every obnoxious man from a state, or slay him with impunity, is to have the law
all right on the statute book, but quietly permit rapine and violence to take their
way, without the hinderance of local authorities. Such a position, Mr. Speaker,
defeats itself by its own absurdities." Rep. Lowe of Kansas, Id. at 375.
"Suppose the state governments are indisposed to act in the suppression of
disorder, or refuse or neglect to punish for crimes against the citizens of the
United States, where is there relief? In such a case has the nation no power ...
In saying what I have thus far, it has been my purpose merely to combat those
positions which, if correct, might, in my judgment, deprive the people of all pro-
tection." Rep. Sheldon of Louisiana, Id. at 368.
"Plausibly and sophistically it is said the laws of North Carolina do not dis-
criminate against them; that the provisions in favor of rights and liberties are
general, that the courts are open to all, that juries, grand and petit, are com-
manded to hear and redress without distinction as to color, race, or political senti-
ment."
"But it is a fact, asserted in the report, that of the hundreds of outrages com-
mitted upon loyal people through the agency of this Klu Klux Klan Organization,
not one has been punished." Sen. Pratt of Indiana, Id. at 505.
6 289 F. 2d 529 (1961).
7 365 U. S. 167 (1961).
8 227 F. 2d 124 (5th Cir., 1955).
9 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871).
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Butler of Massachusetts."° This bill was unsuccessful, however, because it
specifically applied to the South and problems current in 1871. A general
bill with wider application, one that did not point an accusing finger at
any particular group or era was desired, and thus the Civil Rights Bill
as we know it was passed. It seems evident that the intent of Congress
was to enact legislation of more permanent and general application than
much of the discussion printed in the Congressional Globe would indicate.
The courts, through the Civil Rights Act, have allowed a citizen dam-
ages where a state public servant had violated the "search and seizure"
clause, the "self incrimination" clause, and the "due process" clause.
By gleaning the Congressional intent as expressed in the debates
recorded in the Congressional Globe," the Supreme Court, in Monroe v.
Pape and Hardwick v. Hurley, concluded that the Civil Rights Act au-
thorized action in tort in the Federal Courts against state officials who
allegedly deprived citizens of their rights under the Federal Constitution.
Several congressmen were quoted in the Monroe v. Pape opinion as ex-
amples of those who either intended that there be allowed actions in tort
against state officials or who objected to the bill because such actions
were intended.'
2
The Hannah v. Larche13 decision implied, in denying the injunction
against the Civil Rights Commission, that the Federal Government does
not deprive its people of liberty or property when it publicizes evidence
that defames, degrades, or incriminates them.1 4  If non-adjudicatory Fed-
eral proceedings have license to so proceed, it is doubtful that the states
would be subjected under the Civil Rights Act to a restriction as to de-
famatory matter that would give rise to a cause of action.
It is possible to rationally conclude from portions of the debate that
are never refuted by those in attendance that the Congressmen of 1871
did intend the statute to afford a cause of action for the infringements
10 Id. at 173.
11 Id.
12 "Men were murdered, houses were burned, women were outraged, men were
scourged, and officers of the law shot down; and the state made no successful effort
to bring the guilty to punishment or afford protection or redress to the outraged and
innocent." Beatty of Ohio, Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 428 (1871).
"If every sheriff in South Carolina refuses to serve a writ for a colored man,
and those sheriffs are h-ept in office year after year by the people of South Carolina,
and no verdict against them for their failure of duty can be obtained before a
South Carolina jury, the state of South Carolina, through the class of officers who
are its representatives to afford the equal protection of the laws to that class of
citizens, has denied that protection." Hoar of Massachusetts, Id. at 334.
13363 U. S. 420 (1960).
14 See Newman, Rights of Witnesses in Administrative Investigations, 8 UCLA
L. Rev. 756 (1961).
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of a citizen's rights under the Federal Constitution. 15 It would appear
that the Congressmen not only wished to grant redress for the ordinary
torts of the day committed by state officials, but also from the unrefuted
statements of antagonists to the bill, one would be led to believe it was
their intent to sanction such actions as libel, defamation, and invasion of
privacy.
R. E. BECKER
TAXATION-INcomE TAX-WHETHER THE PHRASE "USEFUL LIFE" RE-
FERS TO ACTUAL USEFUL LIFE OR TIM PERIOD OF USEFULNESS TO A PAR-
TICULAR TAXPAYER AND WHETHER THERE IS AN AMOUNT OTHER THAN
THE BUILT-IN SALVAGE VALUE BELOW WHICH A TAXPAYER USING THE
DECLINING BALANCE METHOD MAY NOT DEPRECIATE THE ASSET-In Hertz
Corporation v. United States,' the genius of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue has once again run the gamut of Appellate and Supreme Court
review in attempting to prevent the drawing of a credit claimed against
the United States Treasury. The Hertz Corporation, engaged in leasing
and renting trucks and automobiles on both a long and short term basis,
was merged into by the J. Frank Connor, Inc., through a statutory
merger in 1956, thereby becoming entitled to file claims for refund of
Federal Income Tax to which Connor Inc. might have been entitled. The
merged corporation had used the straight line method of depreciation ;2
however, the 1954 revision to the Internal Revenue Code provided the
15 "Suits may be instituted without regard to amount or character of claim by
any person within the limits of the United States who conceives that he has been
deprived of any right, privilege, or immunity secured him by the Constitution of
the United States, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any state. That is to say, that if a police officer of the city of Richmond
or New York should find a drunken negro or white man upon the streets with
loaded pistol flourishing it, and by virtue of any ordinance, law, or usage, either of
city or state, he takes it away, the officer may be sued, because the right to bear
arms is secured by the Constitution." Whitthorne of Tennessee, Cong. Globe, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess., 337 (1871).
"It authorizes any person who is deprived of any right, privilege or immunity
secured to him by the Constitution of the United States, to bring an action against
the wrongdoer in the Federal Courts, and that without any limit whatsoever as
to the amount in controversy. The deprivation may be of the slightest conceivable
character, the damages in the estimation of any sensible man may not be five
dollars or even five cents, they may be what lawyers call merely nominal damages."
Thurman of Ohio, Id. at 216.
1364 U. S. 122, 80 S. Ct. 1420, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1569 (1960).
226 U. S. C. § 167 (1958); Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167; as well as Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, § 23, provide the authority for the use of the straight line method
of depreciation of property used in the trade or business, or of property held for
the production of income. Under this method the taxpayer deducts the cost of
the property in equal annual installments during the life of the property. The
amount deducted each year is the result of multiplying the reciprocal of the re-
maining useful life by the depreciated basis (in the first year, the purchase price
less salvage value).
